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This paper examines how the distribution of prices changes with the number of competitors in 
the market. Using gasoline price data from the Netherlands we find that as competition 
increases, the distribution of prices spreads out: the low prices go down while the high prices 
go up, on average. As a result, competition has an asymmetric effect on prices. These findings, 
which are consistent with a theoretical model where consumers differ in the information they 
have about prices, imply that consumers’ gains from competition depend on their shopping 
behavior. In our data, all consumers, irrespective of the number of prices they observe, benefit 
from an increase in the number of gas stations. The magnitude of the welfare gain, however, is 
greater for those consumers that are aware of more prices. We conclude that an increase in the 
number of gas stations has a positive but unequal effect on the welfare of consumers in 
the Netherlands. 
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2 University of Groningen 1 Introduction
Economists have dedicated a signi￿cant amount of e⁄ort to analyze the relationship
between the number of ￿rms and prices. Standard oligopoly models assume consumers
are perfectly informed about all prices in the market and predict that an increase in
the number of ￿rms will lower the equilibrium price. Alternative, and more realistic,
models depart from the assumption that all consumers have the same information and
describe equilibria characterized by non-degenerate price distributions.1 In such markets
where price dispersion is prevalent the question of what happens to ￿the￿price when
the number of ￿rms changes is not even well de￿ned. An increase in the number of
￿rms usually a⁄ects the sellers￿pricing strategies and this alters the whole distribution
of equilibrium prices.
Empirical research of markets with price dispersion has usually proceeded by es-
timating the impact of competition on the mean and variance of prices.2 In this paper
we take a broader view and study how the distribution of gasoline prices changes with
the number of competitors in the market. Speci￿cally, we examine how the various per-
centiles (or quantiles) of the price distribution vary with the extent of competition as
measured by the number of ￿rms operating in a market.
We think this broader approach is important for at least two reasons. First, some
theoretical models based on imperfect consumer information and search costs carry the
implicit prediction that the e⁄ect of competition on ￿high￿prices di⁄ers from its e⁄ect
on ￿low￿prices.3 Indeed, we construct a simple model based on similar premises where
it is possible for the frequency of quoting relatively low and high prices to increase with
the number of ￿rms operating in the market. If this prediction is veri￿ed in the data
then it has important welfare implications. Analyzing these implications constitutes the
second motivation for this paper.
1See Baye et al. (2006) for a recent survey of models that rationalize price dispersion.
2See, for example, Borenstein and Rose (1994), Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004), Baye et al.
(2004), Lewis (2008), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
3See, for example, Varian (1980), Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2004). In these
models some consumers know all the prices in the market while others know only one or two prices.
1In markets exhibiting a single price in equilibrium, an increase in the number of
￿rms reduces price and this unambiguously increases welfare for all consumers. When
price dispersion is prevalent, di⁄erent consumers may experience distinct welfare e⁄ects
depending on how di⁄erent parts of the price distribution respond to changes in the
number of competitors. If, as mentioned above, the frequency of low and high prices
increases with competition then whether consumers are successful in paying the lower
prices depends on their shopping behavior. Increased competition is likely to favor more
those consumers exposed to several prices because they may end up paying one of the
lower prices. By the same token, increased competition may even hurt consumers that
observe very few prices (e.g., only one price) because they may end up paying one of the
higher prices. Theoretically, price changes originating from an increase in the number of
￿rms can result in welfare gains for some consumers and, at the same time, in welfare
losses for others. Analyzing the e⁄ects of entry-promoting policies just on the mean and
dispersion of prices cannot capture these distinct welfare e⁄ects.
We use gasoline (Euro 95) prices posted on a daily basis by about 3,100 gas stations
in the Netherlands during May 2006. For a given gas station, the relevant market is
de￿ned as the municipality where the gas station is located. For each of such 423 markets,
we compute a number of percentiles of the price distribution, including the minimum and
maximum prices. We then regress these statistics on the number of gas stations in the
market as well as on municipality characteristics to control for common determinants
of prices and the number of stations. We also use population size and local taxes as
instruments for the (endogenous) number of stations.
The empirical ￿ndings suggest that as competition increases the distribution of
prices spreads out; therefore competition has asymmetric e⁄ects on prices. Speci￿cally,
as the number of gas stations in a market increases, the low prices decrease while the high
prices increase, on average. For example, adding 4 additional gas stations to a single-
station market would, on average, lower the minimum price of a liter of Euro 95 by 0.93
cents and increase the maximum price by 0.83 cents. Likewise, the 90 percentile would
go up by 0.16 cents and the 10 percentile would go down by 0.16 cents. These are small
changes relative to the mean price of 142 cents, but these changes are quantitatively
2signi￿cant relative to the dispersion in (residual) prices which is about 1 cent. This
characterization of the e⁄ect of competition on prices is in line with the theoretical
predictions of our model where consumers have imperfect information about prices and
observe di⁄erent numbers of prices.
In addition, we estimate the gains from increased competition to consumers ob-
serving di⁄erent numbers of prices. In our data, all types of consumers bene￿t from an
increase in the number of stations. The magnitude of the welfare improvement due to
price changes depends, however, on their shopping behavior and is larger for those con-
sumers that observe more prices. The decline in the expected price paid by consumers
that observe 4 or 5 prices is about twice as large as that for consumers that observe only
2 prices.
We believe the message of this paper goes beyond the present application to the
gasoline market in the Netherlands. Since imperfect price information is prevalent in
many markets (telecommunications, health, gas, electricity, etc.), the price e⁄ects of
competition-enhancing policies (industry deregulation, trade liberalization, etc.) might
not be as straightforward as those implied by standard models. Moreover, since increased
competition can potentially have unequal e⁄ects among consumers, distributional issues
become a central part of the welfare assessment of these policies. This advocates the
importance of taking a broader view where the interaction between competition and
consumer policy is taken into consideration (Armstrong, 2008; Waterson, 2003; Wu and
Perlo⁄, 2007).
In Sections 2 and 4, we present a model, inspired by Varian￿ s (1980) model of
sales, of the distribution of prices in an oligopolistic market where consumers di⁄er in
the amount of prices they are exposed to. In Sections 3 and 5 we describe the gasoline
price data for the Netherlands and explains how markets are de￿ned for the empirical
analysis. In Section 3 we also present evidence that gas stations in our data appear
to be using mixed pricing strategies as implied by Varian-style models. Our empirical
strategy is outlined in Section 6, while the empirical results are presented in Section 7.
An empirical assessment of the welfare implications of increased competition is presented
in Section 8. Conclusions close the paper.
32 A model of the distribution of prices
The market for gasoline is a good example of a homogenous good market where price
dispersion is observed.4 Many consumers are informed about a few prices only, and this
gives some monopoly power to the gas stations. In many instances, consumers run out of
fuel and have no option but to ￿ll their gas tanks at the ￿rst gas station they encounter
and this gives additional market power to the gas stations. Prices change quite frequently
and it is not trivial to tell which gas station is the cheapest in a given market. The model
we consider below, inspired by Varian￿ s (1980) model of sales, has these characteristics.
Suppose we have a market with N ￿ 2 identical ￿rms that compete in prices to sell
a homogeneous good to a large number L of consumers. We assume ￿rms￿unit selling
costs, c; are the same across all ￿rms.5 Each consumer wishes to purchase at most a
single unit of the good (e.g., a full tank). The maximum willingness to pay for the good
is common across consumers and is denoted by v > 0:
The entire population of consumers L can be divided into various types, each type
consisting of all the consumers with similar exposure to price information. In particular,
we assume that a fraction ￿s ￿ 0 of the consumers is informed about s prices in the
market, with s = 1;2;:::;N; by construction
PN
s=1 ￿s = 1: The rationale behind this
assumption is that the typical consumer is exposed to a number of prices that depends
on the number of gas stations she observes while driving to her work. We view search in
this market as ￿passive￿in the sense that consumers do not deliberately drive to various
gas stations to observe their prices. We will nevertheless refer to the di⁄erent consumer
types as consumers exhibiting di⁄erent ￿shopping behavior￿ , but we emphasize that this
term is not meant to convey that consumers are actively engaged in searching for the
4Price dispersion in gasoline markets has been widely documented. Recent papers on this topic are,
for example, Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004), Chandra and Tappata (2008), Hosken et al. (2008),
and Lewis (2008).
5We therefore abstract from cost di⁄erences across ￿rms as an explanation for price dispersion in
gasoline markets. For a recent paper where price dispersion re￿ ects di⁄erences in marginal costs see
Goldmanis et. al. (forthcoming). In the empirical part we control for station-speci￿c unobserved e⁄ects
as well as for aggregate e⁄ects which capture ￿ uctuations in the wholesale price of gasoline.
4lowest price of gasoline.6 The vector ￿(N) = (￿1(N);￿2(N);:::;￿N(N)) represents the
distribution of price information in the market. The argument N indicates that ￿(N)
has up to N coordinates and that the value taken by each coordinate may change with
the number of stations in the market (the dependency of ￿ on N will sometimes be left
implicit). For example, if a new station opens on the way to work of some consumers
then these consumers will observe an additional price.7
Firms play a simultaneous-moves Bertrand game. An individual ￿rm i chooses a
price pi taking the prices of the rival ￿rms as given. To rule out pure-strategy equilibria,
we shall assume 1 > ￿1 > 0 (as in Varian, 1980).8 The intuition is as follows. Consider
the position of a ￿rm i and suppose all its rivals were charging a price e p; with c ￿ e p ￿ v.
There are two forces that a⁄ect the price-setting decision of ￿rm i. First, there is a desire
to steal business from competitors and this pushes this ￿rm to undercut the rivals￿price.
This desire arises because there exist consumers who are exposed to various prices and
choose the cheapest gas station to tank (i.e., ￿s > 0 for at least one s 2 f2;3;:::;Ng):
Second, the possibility of extracting surplus from consumers who do not compare prices
prompts ￿rm i to set higher prices than the rivals￿price. This desire arises because there
exist consumers (in particular a fraction ￿1=N > 0) who have no other option but to
tank at ￿rm i. It is easy to see that either of these deviations destabilizes any such price
e p: Therefore a single price cannot accommodate these two incentives.
Denote the mixed pricing strategy of a ￿rm i by a distribution of prices Fi: We shall
only study symmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria where Fi = F for all i = 1;2;:::;N:9
6We do not model the consumer￿ s decision of how many prices to observe. For models of this kind
where there are two types of consumers see, for example, Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Moraga-GonzÆlez
(2004). See also Horta￿su and Syverson (2004) for a empirical model of price dispersion where product
di⁄erentiation is present.
7It is likely that in small markets ￿markets with up to, say, 6-7 gas stations ￿each coordinate of
￿(N) will be strictly positive. However, in markets where there is a very large number of gas stations
(e.g., Rotterdam has 80 gas stations), one would expect ￿s to be zero for large s:
8If ￿1 = 1; then pi = v for all i is a pure-strategy equilibrium. If ￿1 = 0; then pi = c for all i is a
pure-strategy equilibrium.
9It is easy to see that the support of F must be a convex set and that F cannot have atoms. Details
are available from the authors upon request.
5To calculate the expected pro￿t to ￿rm i from charging a price p when its rivals choose
a random pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution F; we ￿rst consider
the chance that ￿rm i sells to a consumer of type s; i.e., to a consumer that observes s
prices in the market. The chance that such a consumer observes the price of ￿rm i is
s=N and, conditional on this, the probability that ￿rm i sells to this consumer at price
p is (1 ￿ F(p))
s￿1 : Therefore, the pro￿ts to ￿rm i from all types of consumers is










In equilibrium, a ￿rm must be indi⁄erent between charging any price in the support
of F and charging the upper bound p. Therefore, any price in the support of F must
satisfy ￿i(p;F) = ￿i(p;F). Since ￿i(p;F) is monotonically increasing in p, it must be








= (v ￿ c)￿1: (2)
This equation cannot be solved explicitly for F; except in special cases. However,
the lower bound can easily be found by setting F = 0 in (2) and solving for p which
gives,
p = c +
(v ￿ c)￿1 PN
s=1 s￿s
Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price distribution F can easily be proven.10
A closer look at equation (2) serves to make an important point to which we will
come back later in Section 4 when we study the e⁄ects of entry on the price distribution.
What truly matters for determining the equilibrium price distribution is not N ￿the
number of ￿rms ￿but the distribution of information among consumers, that is ￿(N).
Changes in ￿(N) ￿holding N constant ￿will alter the equilibrium price distribution
while changes (increases) in N ￿holding ￿(N) constant￿will not. It is therefore changes
in the distribution of information that cause more or less ￿competitive pressure￿in the
10To prove that F exists and is unique, rewrite equation (2) as
PN
s=1 s￿s(1 ￿ F(p))s￿1 =
￿1(v￿c)
p￿c :
The LHS of this equation is positive and decreases in F 2 [0;1]. At F = 1 it takes on value ￿1, while
at F = 0; the LHS equals
PN
s=1 s￿s > ￿1; by contrast, the RHS is a positive constant. As a result, for
every p 2 (p;v); there is a unique solution to equation (2) satisfying F 2 [0;1] and F increases in p:
6market. In Section 4 we shall discuss plausible ways in which a change in the number of
gas stations N may a⁄ect the information structure ￿(N) and the pricing implications
of such a change.
In Figure 1 we plot an example of an equilibrium price density function.11 A
desirable feature of the model is that it allows for bell-shaped density functions. This
is desirable because bell-shaped densities are a typical feature of real-world price data.
In particular, Figure 2 shows that the density of gas prices in the Netherlands is bell-
shaped. Other studies have also found bell-shaped price density functions for various
products (e.g., Roberts and Supina, 2000; Lach, 2002, Hosken et al., 2008). Varian￿ s
(1980) model corresponds to the case where there are only two types of consumers:
fully-informed consumers ￿N who observe all N prices in the market, and uninformed
consumers ￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿N who observe just one price.12 In this case, the price density
is roughly U-shaped (see Figure 2 in Varian (1980)). Thus, because empirical price
densities are usually bell-shaped, the simple Varian model is inconsistent with the data.
Assuming additional consumer heterogeneity in the form of additional consumer types,
besides being a more realistic assumption, allows for plausible price density distributions
to arise in equilibrium.
The main goal of this paper is to examine the relationship between the number
of stations and the distribution of prices. Before we do this, however, it is important
to examine the data for evidence that ￿rms are using mixed pricing strategies. Lacking
such evidence the model presented in this Section would not be appropriate. In the next
Section, we ￿rst describe the gasoline price data and then analyze what the data say on
the use of mixed strategies.
11For a market with N = 5 ￿rms, ￿(N) = (0:73;0:2;0:01;0:01;0:05); v = 1 and c = 0:
12Under these assumptions we can solve explicitly for the distribution of prices:
F(p) = 1 ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿N)(v ￿ p)





(1 ￿ ￿N)(v ￿ c)
(1 ￿ ￿N) + N￿N
￿ p ￿ v:
73 Data on gasoline prices and mixed strategies
We use daily prices for Euro 95 gasoline from a large sample of gas stations in the
Netherlands.13 The price data were obtained from Athlon Car Lease Nederland B.V.,
the largest private car leasing company in the Netherlands with over 129,000 cars as of
the end of 2008 (www.athloncarlease.com). The typical contract between Athlon and
its lessees stipulates that Athlon pays for the gasoline consumed (up to a limit) as well
as for car maintenance, insurance, etc. In order to do this, Athlon gets the lessees￿gas
receipts and it is from these receipts that the fuel prices are retrieved. Athlon￿ s lessees
do not get special discounts so the prices reported by Athlon are actual prices paid by
drivers at the pump.
Price distributions are de￿ned for a given market. In our application, we de￿ne
markets as the geographical area comprised by a municipality. There are 440 munici-
palities in the Netherlands for which we have gasoline price data. The majority of the
municipalities are quite small in terms of population: 55 percent have less than 25,000
inhabitants, and the population in 91 percent of the 440 markets is under 75,000. This
de￿nition of the market ignores stations that may be geographically close (or in the way
to work) but located in di⁄erent municipalities. Because of this, we will examine the
robustness of our ￿ndings to the inclusion of measures of competitors in neighboring
municipalities.14
Another important reason for choosing to work at the municipality level is that we
have economic, geographic and demographic data for almost each municipality. This is
very convenient for our purposes since we will be able to control for common determinants
of the number of stations and prices.
We view our sample of prices in a given market as random draws from the distri-
bution F corresponding to that market. We are able to assume this because of several
13We also use prices for Diesel to examine the robustness of our results (see Section 7.1).
14It is not necessary for the gas stations to be located in a given municipality, provided every gas
station in a given municipality factors into its pricing strategy the same distribution of information
￿(N). This would approximately be true as long as neighboring municipalities do not di⁄er much.
8reasons. First, Athlon￿ s lessees do not pay themselves for the gas (it is part of the con-
tract) and therefore it is reasonable to assume that they have no incentives to search for
gas stations o⁄ering the lowest prices. This is important because otherwise our sample
could be seen as a sample of the cheapest gas stations. Second, all gas stations in the
Netherlands are self-service and therefore there is a single price for gas in each station.
Finally, we believe that the extent to which various prices in a given market are set by
a single ￿rm (because of joint-ownership) and/or re￿ ect collusive agreements is minor,
implying that prices can be viewed as independent draws.
On this last point we ￿rst note that although we do not have information on the
gas stations￿owners, according to the Dutch Competition Authority about 62 percent
of the gas stations are owned and operated by independent dealers (NMa, 2006). The
remaining stations belong to the main oil producers: BP, Esso, Shell, Texaco and Total.
But even among these branded stations, most are dealer-operated. For example, Shell
serves fewer than 15 percent of the gas stations and about 2/3 of the Shell-branded gas
stations are operated by dealers who are free to set their own prices. This suggests that
joint ownership of gas stations is not such a prevalent phenomenon as one may be led
to believe from casual observation (although we have no data on joint ownership of gas
stations by independent owners). An exception to this is the highway market, where
most gas stations, 63 percent, are owned and operated by the large oil producers (NMa,
2006). Second, although there is no direct information on the extent of collusion (if at
all) in the Dutch gasoline market, the Dutch Competition Authority has only identi￿ed
the highway market as potentially collusive. The main reason for this assessment is
again that most of the gas stations located on highways are owned and operated by the
major oil producers. In fact, since 2002, the Dutch government has forced divestitures of
highway stations but not in other markets. Because of these two last reasons, potential
collusion and joint decision-making, we decided to remove the stations that were located
in highways from our sample. We think that excluding these stations leaves us with a
large sample of gas stations whose prices can be considered as independent.
Prices were obtained from 3,300 gas stations for the period May 5￿ 26 2006, except
for May 10 and May 17, for a total of 20 days. After removal of the 217 stations located
9in highways we are left with 3,083 gas stations. Because the price information arrives
directly from the lessees, not all stations are sampled every day, which results in an
unbalanced panel data of gas stations.15 There are 32,348 station-day observations on
Euro 95 prices.
As an illustrative device, the left panel in Figure 2 displays a kernel estimate of
the density function of prices. The average price of Euro 95 gas in our sample is 142.04
cents and the average of the within-market standard deviations is 2.52 cents. The lowest
price is 119 cents while the highest price in the sample is 167.16 Not surprisingly, there
is dispersion in gasoline prices but, as evidenced by the coe¢ cient of variation, it is not
very large. However, the daily variation in the total cost of ￿lling-up a 50 liter tank ￿
the di⁄erence in cost between buying at the highest-priced and lowest-priced station in
a given day ￿is between 8.5 and 24 euros which is not a trivial amount.17
Because price di⁄erentials among stations are likely to be driven by time-invariant
factors (e.g., brand, ownership structure, location, availability of a convenience store,
additional services, etc.), it is problematic to compare prices of di⁄erent gas stations,
even within the same market. The same is true when comparing gas prices in di⁄erent
days. We therefore remove day and station-speci￿c e⁄ects from actual (raw) prices
to obtain a residual price which is more comparable across days and stations.18 These
residual prices are obtained by regressing prices on station-speci￿c dummies and on a
15We have one price of Euro 95 per station per day. The number of days or, equivalently, the number
of price quotations per gas station in the sample ranges from 1 to 17 days with an average of 10.5 days
and a median of 12 days.
16The 119 price is an outlier; the second lowest price is 129 cents. However, we do no think this is a
typo since the very same gas station is also charging a very low price for Diesel on a di⁄erent day (78
cents when the average is 108 cents).
17The stations exhibiting the extreme prices can be anywhere in the Netherlands so this calculation
is purely illustrative. On May 11, the maximum and minimum price were 1.49 and 1.32 euros per liter.
This 17 cent di⁄erence translates into a 8.5 euros saving in ￿lling up a 50 liter tank. On May 14, the
maximum and minimum price were 1.19 and 1.67 euros per liter, respectively, implying a 24 euro saving
in ￿lling up a 50 liter tank.
18As done, for example, by Lach (2002), Hosken et al. (2008), and Lewis (2008). A similar approach
is taken when estimating auction data in order to generate ￿homogenized bids￿or ￿normalized bids￿
which are comparable across auctions (see, for example, Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003)).
10cubic trend, separately for each municipality.19 Residual prices are therefore detrended
prices net of station-level e⁄ects. The mean residual price for each station (and for
each municipality) is then zero. The implicit assumption here is that station and day
e⁄ects a⁄ect only the mean price charged by a gas station. By removing these e⁄ects, we
￿homogenize￿stations within markets so that we can treat residual prices in a market
as coming from the same distribution of prices F: Of course, the distribution of residual
prices varies across markets due to di⁄erences in the number of stations and in the
information structure (￿shopping behavior￿ ) as well as in v and c.20
We will use the residual prices in our empirical analysis; their distribution is plotted
in the right panel of Figure 2. As expected, the average of the within-market standard
deviations in residual prices, 1.05, is lower than that in the raw data. Nevertheless, as
can be seen in the graph, residual prices still exhibit considerable variation.21
3.1 Evidence on mixed strategies
We now present empirical evidence on the use of mixed strategies by gas stations. This
issue has been examined by Lach (2002) for three food products and an appliance in
Israel, by Wildenbeest (2008) for groceries in the UK and by Hosken et. al. (2008),
for gasoline prices in the suburbs of Washington DC. All these studies found evidence
supporting the use of mixed pricing strategies.
Speci￿cally, we check whether gas stations vary their relative position in the cross-
sectional distribution of prices over time, as implied by the use of mixed strategies.
Simply put, the use of mixed strategies implies that we should not observe gas stations
always selling at high prices or always selling at low prices.
We observe the residual price posted by gas station i on day t and we locate this
19We do not use day dummies because in 5.4 percent of the observations there is only one station
per day per municipality. Moreover, in one municipality (Reiderland) we only have one observation and
therefore residual prices cannot be computed, leaving us with residual prices in 439 municipalities.
20Note, however, that the theoretical model in Section 2 implies that proportional changes in v and
c a⁄ect only the location of F: In any case, removing station-speci￿c e⁄ects also removes the e⁄ect of
market-level factors a⁄ecting the location of F:
21The longer left tail of the distribution is due to the outlier price mentioned in footnote 16. Removing
this station makes the density much more symmetric and lowers the standard deviation to 1.06.
11residual price within the price distribution observed in i0s market on day t: We can then
track the relative position of the station￿ s residual price over time.22 There are a number
of ways of doing this.
We start by computing the number of days that a gas station was in the qth quartile
of the cross-sectional price distribution. We denote this statistic by Tq; q = 1;2;3;4: Tq is
expressed as a percentage of the total number of days a station appears in the sample.23
For example, if the station was never in the ￿rst quartile of the distribution then T1 = 0;
whereas if the station was always in the ￿rst quartile then T1 = 1: Clearly, for each gas
station, T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 = 1: Figure 3 plots the histograms of T1 ￿ T4.
If many stations always remain in the same quartile of the (residual) price distri-
bution we should observe a large number of ￿rms with Tq = 1: Figure 3 indicates that
this is not the case. 2.15 percent of the stations were always in the ￿rst quartile and,
for higher quartiles, this percentage is even lower. The low number of stations always
selling in the same quartile of the price distribution is consistent with the use of mixed
strategies.24
We also observe in the top-left graph of Figure 3 that 14 percent of the stations
were never in the ￿rst quartile of the price distribution (T1 = 0). This means that about
84 percent (100￿14￿2:15) of the stations were part (but not all) of their time in the ￿rst
quartile of the distribution and the remaining time in other quartiles. Similarly, 77, 81
and 75 percent of the stations were part (but not all) of their time in the second, third
and fourth quartile of the distribution, respectively, and the remaining time in other
quartiles.25 Although this is evidence that a sizable number of stations moves around
22Recall that the time horizon is the 20 days in May 2006 but no station appears in the sample for
more than 17 days.
23Note that the cross-sectional distribution in day t is de￿ned for the stations which quoted prices in
day t: Therefore the number of stations, and their identity, may change from day to day. The statistics
were computed in all markets and days where the number of stations was at least 4.
24When using the actual prices, 20 percent of the stations always charge prices in the ￿rst quartile of
the distribution (T1 = 1), 1.7 percent always in the second quartile (T2 = 1), 3.4 percent always in the
third quartile (T3 = 1), and 7 percent always in the fourth quartile (T4 = 1). These ￿gures are higher
because actual prices re￿ ect store-speci￿c factors (e.g., location) that are ￿xed over time.
25The corresponding percentages for the actual price data are 42, 54, 47 and 33 percent.
12the cross-sectional price distribution, the histograms of T1 ￿T4 do not reveal how long a
particular gas station stayed in each quartile of the price distribution. We examine this
in Figure 4.
Figure 4 graphs, for 50 randomly selected gas stations, the percentage of days each
of these stations was in the ￿rst, second, third and fourth quarter of the cross-sectional
distribution of prices.26 The changing bar colors indicate that only two stations remained
in the same quartile during all the days they appear in the sample (stations number 2
and 9).27
These ￿gures still do not reveal how gas stations ￿travel￿across the quartiles of the
price distribution over time, i.e., the extent of intra-distribution dynamics. The transition
process from one cross-sectional distribution to another can be modelled by assuming
that this transition is done in a Markovian fashion through a 4￿4 transition matrix whose
(i;j)
th entry gives the probability that a gas station in the ith quartile in day t moves to
the jth quartile in day t0 > t. Consistent estimates of these probabilities are the sample
proportions of stations moving from one quartile to another in each market. Assuming a
time- and market-invariant transition matrix, the estimated transition matrices for each
day and market are averaged to produce a single (estimated) transition matrix.
Table 1 presents estimates of 1￿ week (t0 = t + 7) transition probabilities.28 Ex-
amination of the transition matrix gives a good idea on the extent of intra-distribution
mobility. If stations keep their positions over time ￿lack of mobility ￿then the matrix
should have ￿large￿diagonal entries. If there is a lot of mobility across the quartiles of
the distribution this would be re￿ ected in ￿large￿o⁄-diagonal probabilities. The proba-
bility of remaining in the ￿rst quartile is 33 percent, which means that the probability
26We plot only 50 stations that were randomly sampled from the 2472 gas stations appearing in
markets and days where the number of stations was at least 4. Plotting all the stations generates graphs
that are too cluttered to be readable.
27Using the actual price data, 62 percent of the stations (31 stations) move between 2 or more quartiles
of the price distribution.
28The entries are weighted averages of the estimated transition probabilities for each day and market
with weights equal to the proportion of observations in each cell.
13that a low-price station will be selling at a higher price a week ahead is 67 percent.29
Overall, the diagonal entries do not appear to be large relative to the o⁄-diagonal terms.
This is indicative of signi￿cant intra-distribution dynamics, as found in the studies cited
at the beginning of this subsection.
4 The distribution of prices and the number of ￿rms
We are interested in how the pricing strategy of the ￿rms, given by the distribution
function that solves (2), changes with the number of competitors N. As explained before,
changes in N have no e⁄ect on prices per se. It is via changes in consumer information
￿(N) that an increase in the number of competitors results in more or less ￿competitive
pressure￿in the market.
Let an additional gas station enter a market operated by N stations. The e⁄ect
of such entry on the exposure to prices of a single consumer will depend on a number
of factors including the location of the new gas station, the location of the consumer￿ s
home and that of her job. In our model, the change in overall consumer information is
represented by the change from ￿(N) to ￿(N + 1).
Let F(pj￿(N);v;c) be the equilibrium price distribution that solves equation (2).
Even though we do not have an explicit expression for the equilibrium price distribution,
we can perform comparative statics by examining the inverse of the price distribution.
From (2), we obtain
p(￿(N);v;c) = c +
(v ￿ c)￿1(N)
PN
s=1 s￿s(N)(1 ￿ F)s￿1 (3)
where F takes values on [0;1].
If we let F take on values f0;0:1;0:2;:::;0:9;1g in equation (3) we obtain the
appropriate percentile of the equilibrium price distribution. As shown below, we use
the inverse expression to examine how di⁄erent percentiles of the price distribution are
a⁄ected by changes in the number of competitors. Let F(pj￿(N + 1);v;c) denote the
29Using the actual price data we obtain probabilities of remaining in the same quartile a week ahead
equal to .76, .47, .51 and .69 for the ￿rst, second, third and fourth quartile, respectively.
14price distribution after entry of one additional ￿rm, and p(￿(N +1);v;c) its inverse. We
can then compute the di⁄erence between the (inverse) price distributions with N and
N + 1 ￿rms:
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If we let F take on values f0;0:1;0:2;:::;0:9;1g in equation (4), we obtain the e⁄ect
of an increase in N on the di⁄erent percentiles of the equilibrium price distribution.
For example, setting F = 0:8; (4) gives the change in the 80th percentile of the price
distribution when the number of ￿rms increases from N to N + 1:
The main point we want to make here is that the way ￿rm entry a⁄ects the di⁄erent
percentiles of the price distribution is intimately linked to the way ￿(N) changes into
￿(N+1): The coordinates of ￿(N) and ￿(N+1) may di⁄er in multiple ways but what we
can reasonably expect is that entry causes the price information set of every consumer to
become weakly larger, and that of some consumers to become strictly larger. Therefore,
we can reasonably expect that entry implies,
(1) ￿1(N + 1) ￿ ￿1(N)
(5)
(2) ￿s(N + 1) > ￿s(N) for at least one s = 2;3;:::N + 1
where it is understood that ￿N+1(N) = 0:
Unfortunately little can be said about how the other coordinates of ￿(N) will
change with N. To see this, consider for example the e⁄ect of an increase in N on the
share of consumers exposed to s prices. After entry, some consumers who used to observe
s ￿ 1 prices will observe s prices, while some consumers who used to be exposed to s
prices will be exposed to s+1 prices. These two e⁄ects operate in opposite direction on
15￿s and therefore the net e⁄ect on ￿s is in principle undetermined. This indeterminacy
implies that, at this degree of generality, the di⁄erent percentiles of the price distribution
may increase or decrease with the number of ￿rms, depending on parameters.
We provide two examples that illustrate this point.30
Example 1 In this example, N = 2 and ￿(2) = (0:5;0:5): Half of the consumers pass
one gas station while driving to work, while the other half pass two stations. Both types of
consumers ￿ll their tank at the station o⁄ering the lowest price. Suppose that after entry
of a new gas station, we have ￿(3) = (0:45;0:52;0:03): That is, the share of consumers
exposed to just one price goes down to 45 percent, but the share of consumers observing
two and three prices increases. The resulting equilibrium price distributions are depicted
in Figure 5.
In Example 1, the price distribution FN dominates the price distribution FN+1 in
a ￿rst-order stochastic sense. As a result, the e⁄ect of an increase in the number of
competitors is to decrease all the quantiles of the price distribution. Example 1 accords
with the usual intuition that markets with more ￿rms have lower prices. The e⁄ect of
increasing N, however, is stronger at the lower quantiles than at the higher quantiles of
the price distribution. In other words, the high prices fall less than the low prices when
we move from a market with N ￿rms to a market with N + 1 ￿rms.
We can actually make this result more general. If the coordinates of ￿(N) and






; for all s = 1;2;:::N: (6)
then the price distribution FN ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the price distribution
FN+1: Condition (6) says that the share of consumers comparing s prices relative to the
non-comparing (price-insensitive) consumers increases in N. This condition is su¢ cient
for stochastic dominance, as can readily be seen upon inspection of equation (4).
30In all numerical examples (Figures 5-7) we set v = 1 and c = 0:
16Example 2 The initial situation is as in Example 1 where N = 2 and ￿(2) = (0:5;0:5) but
we assume that after entry of a new gas station we have ￿(3) = (0:45;0:1;0:45): Again
the share of consumers exposed to just one price goes down to 45 percent, but, in contrast
to Example 1, the share of consumers observing two prices decreases in favor of the share
of consumers observing three prices, which goes up from 0 to 45 percent. The resulting
equilibrium price distributions are depicted in Figure 6.
What is striking in Figure 6 is that the price distributions cannot be ranked ac-
cording to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. We see, for example, that the 80th percentile
of the price distribution increases in N while the 20th percentile decreases. That is, the
e⁄ect of competition on ￿high￿prices di⁄ers from its e⁄ect on ￿low￿prices.
In order to understand the intuition behind these results, recall that the distri-
bution of prices of a ￿rm is chosen to maximize expected pro￿ts accruing from the
various groups of consumers, given other ￿rms￿strategies. These pro￿ts, as shown is
equation (2), are constant at all prices chosen with positive probability. Note also that
the elasticity of the expected demand of the consumers observing s prices is equal to
p(s￿1)fN(p)=(1￿FN(p)):31 Thus, keeping rivals￿strategies ￿xed, this elasticity is inde-
pendent of N: By contrast, the elasticity of the expected demand of consumers observing
N prices is p(N ￿1)fN(p)=(1￿FN(p)); which increases in N: Therefore, if the number of
￿rms increases, and keeping the rivals￿strategies ￿xed, only the elasticity of the expected
demand of the fully informed consumers changes.
Consider now a ￿rm contemplating how to change its strategy as a response to
entry. This ￿rm knows that the expected demand from the fully informed consumers
becomes more elastic as N increases. This ￿rm has therefore an incentive to o⁄er even
lower prices when N increases. This is what we see in the two examples above; the lower
bound of the price distribution falls as we move from a market with N ￿rms to a market
with N + 1 ￿rms.
On the other hand, in order to compensate for o⁄ering lower prices and getting
31Every consumer demands at most a single unit so individual demands are inelastic. However, given
the strategies of the rival ￿rms, the expected number of units sold by a ￿rm increases as this ￿rm reduces
its price.
17lower pro￿ts, ￿rms increase the frequency of their high prices in order to extract more
pro￿ts from the less-informed consumers (e.g., those observing a single price). The
latter￿ s lack of full information on prices allows ￿rms to increase the frequency at which
they charge high prices. The strength of this ￿compensating￿e⁄ect depends on the mass
of fully-informed consumers. This e⁄ect is therefore much stronger in Example 2 than in
Example 1 because in the former case 90 percent of the consumers who used to observe
two prices get to observe three prices when N increases from 2 to 3, as opposed to 6
percent in Example 1. As a result, the lower bound declines more in Example 2 than
in Example 1, but also the frequency of high prices increases in Example 2 but not in
Example 1. This e⁄ect may be strong enough so as to drive mean prices up. In fact, in
Example 2 the mean price increases from 0.549 to 0.554.32 Figure 7 shows that when we
move from two to three ￿rms, the very low and the high prices become more frequent in
detriment of intermediate prices.
In sum, the competitive e⁄ect of an increase in N is to prompt ￿rms to o⁄er ￿lowest
ever￿prices by shifting some probability mass towards even lower prices (prices that had
zero density before the increase in N), and, at the same time, to increase the frequency of
high prices to keep the ￿rm￿ s incentives balanced. In Example 1 the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates
and the price distributions do not cross each other. In Example 2 the second e⁄ect is
su¢ ciently strong so that high prices become more frequent after entry. Thus, it is the
presence of a su¢ ciently large mass of fully-informed consumers that prompt ￿rms to
more extreme pricing.
As these examples indicate, the overall implication of the changes in the equilibrium
strategies of the ￿rms on the prices the various consumers pay is subtle since we need to
account for changes in the support of the price distribution and for changes in the price
frequencies.
32Other models show a tendency for average prices to rise with N, e.g., Stahl (1989). In Stahl￿ s model,
there are two consumer types (shoppers, who observe all the prices in the market, and non-shoppers,
who just observe one), search is endogenous and the price distribution converges to a distribution
degenerated at the monopoly price as the number of ￿rms operating in the market goes to in￿nity. Our
model, however, presents a more realistic information structure and, as seen in Example 1, mean prices
need not rise with N.
18Our goal is to estimate the causal e⁄ect of a change in N on the distribution of
prices. Our theoretical model makes clear that the e⁄ect of a change in N works through
changes in the distribution of price information among consumers. That is, we view
the causal e⁄ect of N on prices as that e⁄ect arising solely from an induced change in
the (unobserved) information-related variables ￿: In other words, holding ￿ constant,
changes in N should have no causal e⁄ect on prices. The theoretical model, however, is
silent about how N a⁄ects the distribution of information ￿(N) and therefore it does not
o⁄er testable implications (besides the use of mixed pricing strategies). Nevertheless, the
model o⁄ers a framework for thinking about the mechanisms through which N a⁄ects
prices, while the direction and magnitude of such e⁄ect remains an empirical matter.
In order to link with the empirical part of this paper we now probe into the re-
lationship between ￿ and N: Let x1 denote other determinants (e.g., economic and
geographical variables) of the distribution of price information in the market. Thus, the
relationship between ￿ and N is,
￿ = ￿(N;x1)
while the distribution of prices in equilibrium is given by F(pj￿(N;x1);v;c):
If we were to observe ￿ directly we could ￿rst estimate the e⁄ect of ￿ on prices
and then estimate the e⁄ect of N on ￿: Because ￿ is not observed we cannot proceed
in this way. Instead, we will use the variation in N across markets to estimate the
e⁄ect of N on prices. This poses two immediate problems: we need to control for the
possible correlation between x1 and N; and we need to account for factors other than
x1 that a⁄ect both the number of ￿rms and prices, e.g., v. If we want to estimate
the causal e⁄ect of a change in N on the distribution of prices, we need to ensure that
changes in N are not accompanied by changes in other determinants of the distribution of
prices F(pj￿(N;x1);v;c) except for direct changes in ￿: The existence of such exogenous
variation in N is crucial for interpreting the e⁄ect of a change in the number of ￿rms on
prices.
Economic theory is very useful in pinning down the determinants of N and thereby
in suggesting sources of exogenous variation (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). In a long-run
19market equilibrium with free entry, the number of stations is determined by a zero-pro￿t
condition, after covering the entry costs (E);
L￿(N;x1;v;c) ￿ E = 0 (7)
where ￿(N;x1;v;c) ￿ ￿(￿(N;x1);v;c) are pro￿ts per consumer (equation (1) divided
by L and evaluated at the equilibrium price distribution).
This condition implies that the long-run market equilibrium value of N is deter-
mined by (x1;v;c;L;E);
N
￿ = N(x1;v;c;L;E) (8)
It is therefore only when N changes because of changes in L and/or in E that the
variation in N is exogenous to prices in the sense that nothing else a⁄ecting the price
distribution F(pjN;x1;v;c) changes when such a change in N occurs. Thus, L and E are
natural instruments for N since they help in determining the number of ￿rms but, given
c;x1 and v; do not a⁄ect prices. Changes in L and/or in E, given c;x1 and v; generate
exogenous variation in N which will allow us to estimate its causal e⁄ect on prices.
5 Data on the number of gas stations
In order to estimate the e⁄ect of N on prices we need data on the number of all gas
stations in each municipality for which we have prices. We obtained a list of all the gas
stations and their addresses operating in the Netherlands in August 2007. These stations
were assigned to municipalities according to their addresses. This allows us to know the
number Nm of gas stations operating in each market m: We do not have price data on
all Nm because we observe gas prices only from Athlon￿ s lessees who do not patronize
all the gas stations in a market. On average across markets, however, the number of
stations in the sample represents 87 percent of all the gas stations in the Netherlands
which is a reasonable coverage.
The mean number of stations by market is 8.2, respectively, and there is a lot of
variation across markets ￿the standard deviation is almost as large as the mean, 7.6
stations. This variation is better seen in Table 2 where the distribution of the number of
20stations per market (municipality) is tabulated. Nm ranges between 1 to 80 (Amsterdam
has 59 stations and Rotterdam has 80). Sixty percent of the markets have 7 or less
stations.
5.1 Preliminary evidence
In Table 3 we tabulate the average, over all markets having the same number of stations
N; of various percentiles in the residual price distribution, as well as the averages of
the minimum and maximum residual prices. The 10th and 25th percentile as well as the
median price appear to decline with the number of stations, while the 90th percentile
seems to be increasing in N: These e⁄ects are even stronger for the extreme prices. The
magnitudes of these changes may not seem large ￿usually fractions of one cent￿but
they should be viewed relative to the small price dispersion of gasoline (residual) prices,
which amounts to 1.05 cent.
Of course, simple di⁄erences in means cannot be used to infer the e⁄ect of changes
in N on the distribution of prices. There are many factors that a⁄ect both N and prices
and, if these are not controlled for, part of their e⁄ect is attributed to changes in N:
In order to control for such confounding factors we proceed to a multivariate regression
analysis of the data.33
6 Empirical strategy
We use residual prices in our empirical analysis; pit now refers to the residual price
of station i in day t: In each market m; we have Km observations (by station and
day) on residual prices pit.34 As explained in Section 4, (Nm;x1m;vm;cm) completely
determines the equilibrium price distribution in market m: We assume that the sample
33Moreover, the minimum and maximum prices, being order statistics, tend to decrease and increase,
respectively, with the sample size. This implies that there is a built-in tendency for the extreme prices
to vary systematically with N (which is highly correlated with, but not equal to, the sample size in each
market).
34The sample size Km depends on the number of stations sampled in the market (which is always
less than or equal to Nm) and on the number of days each station appears in the sample (10.5 days
on average). Thus, Km is usually much larger than Nm: The mean value of Km is 73.5 station-day
observations.
21of residual prices in market m is randomly drawn from the same distribution FNm(p) ￿
F(pjNm; x1m;vm;cm). This accords with the way in which prices were collected. Let
qm(￿) be the ￿th quantile of the residual price distribution in market m: The quantile
qm(￿) is a function of (Nm;x1m;vm;cm); the determinants of the price distribution. By
analyzing how N a⁄ects qm(￿) at di⁄erent values of ￿; we learn about the e⁄ect of
changing N on the distribution of prices.
In order to do this we ￿rst estimate qm(￿) by the [nm￿]th smallest value among all
nm observations in market m. We denote this estimator by b qm(￿): This estimator has an
asymptotic normal distribution with expected value qm(￿) and variance
￿(1￿￿)
KmfNm(qm(￿))2;
0 < ￿ < 1 where fNm is the conditional density of pit given (Nm; x1m;vm;cm). In a
second step, we regress b qm(￿) on Nm;x1m;vm;cm using the municipality-level data. This
provides us with an estimate of the e⁄ect of the number of stations on prices. We run a
separate regression for each chosen value of ￿:35
An alternative estimator of the e⁄ect of the number of stations on prices could
be obtained by estimating the quantile functions directly with the station-level price
data pit using a standard ￿quantile-regression￿procedure. One should note, however,
that although the two estimators are not numerically identical in ￿nite samples, they
are ￿rst-order asymptotically equivalent.36 We do not adopt the quantile regression
approach for a number of reasons. First, the regressors (N;x1;v;c) vary only at the level
of the municipality, and this procedure might underestimate standard errors, even if the
standard errors were clustered at the municipality level. Because market-level regressions
are based on a much smaller number of observations (about 440 observations) than
station-level regressions (about 31,000 observations), the former procedure generates
35See Chamberlain (1994) and Bassett, Tam and Knight (2002) for examples of this 2-step approach.
36If the function being estimated is the mean then a weighted regression of market level data produces
the same estimates as those obtained from station level data. But this is not the case for quantiles.
In our data, the store-level and weighted market level estimates are quite close to each other (i.e., well
within 1 standard deviation of each other), when the weights are the number of observations in each
market. This was also observed by Basset, Tam and Knight (2002) in their study of ACT scores by
school. See also Knight (2002) for the asymptotic equivalence results and for a comparison of both
estimators using simulated data.
22more conservative standard errors.37 Second, the procedure based on station-level data
gives more weight to the largest municipalities because the number of sample observations
(Km) increases with the number of stations (Nm): If the e⁄ect of the number of stations
on prices is nonlinear, and this is not fully accounted for in the functional speci￿cation
of the regression function, estimates based on station-level data will overly represent the
e⁄ect of competition on prices in the largest markets. We want to give equal weights
to all markets so as to be able to interpret the estimated coe¢ cient as the e⁄ect of
changing N on the price distribution of a market chosen at random.38 Finally, it is
known than the normal approximation is not adequate for extreme quantiles and values
and this can a⁄ect the asymptotic distribution of the estimators based on station-level
data. With market-level data, however, we are estimating an average of the extreme
quantiles and values across markets so that a normal approximation applies when the
number of markets is large. We therefore use unweighted market-level data to estimate
the mean quantiles regressions E [b qm(￿)jNm;x1m;vm;cm]:
Regarding functional form, we make a separability assumption on the conditional
expectation function between N and (x1;v;c) and specify the N part in natural loga-
rithm, i.e.,
E [b qm(￿)jNm;x1m;vm;cm] = ￿0 + ￿N lnNm + h(x1m;vm;cm) (9)
The logarithmic speci￿cation implies that the marginal e⁄ect of N on a price
quantile is decreasing in N: The justi￿cation for this is that a given increase in N is
likely to generate a larger change in the information structure ￿(N;x1) when N is small
than when it is large. For example, adding a station to a 2-station market will likely
change the distribution of information in a more drastic manner than when N = 10: The
logarithmic speci￿cation is a parsimonious way of achieving this. In any case, we will
check the robustness of our conclusions to alternative functional forms.
37An argument made by Guryan and Charles (2008).
38The station-level estimates can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of changing N on the price distribution
faced by a consumer chosen at random. Although this is of interest and certainly important for welfare
analysis, it is not the focus of our paper.
23The most important econometric problem is that (x1;v;c) is unobserved and cor-
related with N (see (8)). Thus, ignoring the term h(￿) and treating it as error will bias
our estimates of ￿N: We approach this problem in two ways. First, we use an array of
covariates x to proxy for (x1;v;c) and, secondly, we use instruments for N to deal with
the remaining correlation.
Speci￿cally, we take a linear projection of h(x1;v;c) on x;
h(x1;v;c) = x￿ + r with Cov(r;x) = 0
which results in
E [b qm(￿)jNm;xm;rm] = ￿0 + ￿N lnNm + xm￿ + rm (10)
The problem with using proxies for h(x1;v;c) is that there is no guarantee that
ln(N) will be uncorrelated with the unobserved r in equation (10). The correlation
between ln(N) and the residual heterogeneity r; however, need not be strong if x includes
the main determinants of (x1;v;c): That is, controlling for su¢ cient municipality-level
characteristics can potentially ameliorate this endogeneity problem. The availability of
economic, geographic and demographic data at the municipality level is one of the main
reasons for de￿ning markets as municipalities.
Nevertheless, because the proxies are not perfect, the omitted variable bias is never
completely eliminated. As shown in Section 4, L and E are correlated with N but not
with prices given (x1;v;c): In order to use L and E as instruments we therefore need
to assume that our proxy variables x are capturing all the correlation between (x1;v;c)
and (L;E) so that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residual heterogeneity r:
In slightly stronger terms, we require that
E(rjE;L;x) = 0 (11)
This identifying assumption says that among markets with the same observed
characteristics x; variations in population size and entry costs are not associated with
(v;x1;c); i.e., with the willingness to pay for gasoline and with shopping behavior. If,
for example, more a› uent municipalities have higher willingness to pay, higher entry
24costs and lower population then this assumption would be violated if we do not include
measures of income or wealth among the controls x: As usual, the strength of this
assumption depends on what is included in the vector of proxies x (we describe x in
detail in Section 7).
For the number of consumers L to be a valid instrument, the unobserved (part of)
marginal cost must be independent of market size. In connection with this, we note that
variable costs in gasoline retailing are mostly driven by the cost of gasoline. The typical
brand in the Netherlands buys its gasoline from the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp
(ARA) spot market (this is true even for Shell which sells much more gasoline than
it produces). The ARA market is a centralized marketplace where price discrimination
mechanisms such as quantity discounts are unfeasible due to the anonymity of the traders.
Therefore, it is reasonably safe to assume that most gas stations in the Netherlands face
similar wholesale gasoline prices irrespective of the population level in the areas where
the stations are located.
The standard errors of the estimators need to account for the heteroskedasticity
induced by the sampling error in estimating the quantiles,
￿(1￿￿)
Kmfm(qm(￿))2: Instead of esti-
mating the density function we use (White) standard errors that are robust to arbitrary
heterogeneity.39
7 Empirical Results
Panels A-D in Table 4 present estimates of several variants of equation (10), as well as
similar regressions for the minimum and maximum price in each market. The regressions
for each price statistic are run separately since there are no e¢ ciency gains to joint
estimation when the regressors are the same across equations. Panel A presents OLS
estimates of regressing a price statistic on ln(N) only. These regressions are based on
439 observations (municipalities) because residual prices could not be computed for one
39As a check we also bootstrapped the standard errors of the 2SLS regressions by resampling from
the (b qm(￿);Nm;xm) data. These bootstrapped standard errors, based on 1000 replications, are between
8 and 20 percent (15 percent on average) higher than the White standard errors. We chose to use the
latter because they are easier to compute and do not alter any of our conclusions regarding statistical
signi￿cance.
25municipality (Reiderland) where only one station has prices in only one day. The e⁄ect of
N is negative for the lower price percentiles and positive for the higher ones, as predicted
by Example 2 of the theoretical model. The more extreme the price statistics, the more
signi￿cant are the e⁄ects of N: The median price also decreases with N but this e⁄ect
is marginally signi￿cant. As N increases, say from 1 to 2 stations, the minimum price
is estimated to decrease by 0.35 cents (￿0:508 ￿ log2); while the maximum price is
estimated to increase by 0.26 cents. These are not small changes relative to the standard
deviation in residual prices (1.05 cent).
In Panel B we add 39 provincial dummies to control for unobserved time-invariant
e⁄ects at the regional level.40 These regional e⁄ects are always jointly signi￿cant at the
1 percent level (also in panels C and D). The estimated coe¢ cients of ln(N) increase
somewhat, particularly for prices in the middle of the distribution.
In Panel C we add proxies for consumers￿reservation values (v) and for shopping
behavior (x1): We do not directly proxy for c because, as mentioned above, variable
production costs are quite similar across markets. The regressions in panel C and D are
estimated on 423 markets because of missing data on some of the covariates. The reasons
for missing covariate data are unrelated to the price of gasoline and therefore there is
no risk of sample selection bias. Indeed, Panel B was reestimated for the sample of 423
observations used in Panel C and D and the estimated coe¢ cients are very similar to
those reported in the table.
Perhaps among the main determinants of the willingness to pay and of shopping
behavior for gasoline is income. We therefore include average household income as proxy
for both v and x1: Because of income and substitution e⁄ects we expect this variable
to be positively correlated with the willingness to pay and with the share of non-price
sensitive consumers (￿1): Thus, income should positively a⁄ect prices. We also include
the share of cars registered to business (out of total cars in the municipality), which
should be positively correlated with the willingness to pay for gas and therefore also
a⁄ect prices positively.
40There are 40 regional areas (known as COROP areas) in the Netherlands. Each regional area
comprises several municipalities.
26An additional set of controls is related to the geographic or spatial characteristics
of markets. The distribution of price information may vary with the geography of the
market. Consumers￿shopping behavior may be di⁄erent in a geographically small, in-
terconnected municipality than in a large, spatially-spread municipality. We therefore
add controls for the total area of the municipality (in km2); the area that is land (also
in km2); the share of land that is built (urbanized) and the share that is agrarian (the
remainder is land for recreation and forests), and the kilometers of roads within the
municipality borders.41
We also add the sample size Km to the list of regressors. We do this because the
sample minimum and maximum are monotonic functions of the sample size, while Km
is correlated with the number of stations in the market (the simple correlation between
Km and ln(Nm) is 0.72), as well as to control for any sample size e⁄ects in the estimation
of the quantiles. In this way, the estimates of ￿N are less likely to re￿ ect the built-in
correlation between the price statistics and sample size.
The e⁄ect of adding these additional regressors is to lower the estimates of ￿N,
particularly for the lower prices. In addition, the precision of the estimates decreases
because the additional estimated parameters do not contribute much to the regressions￿
explanatory power (we expand on this below) but reduce the left-over variation in lnN.
As a result, most of the estimated ￿N￿ s, except in the minimum and maximum price
regressions, are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Our ￿nal set of regressions in panel D uses 2SLS to eliminate potential biases from
unobserved common determinants of both prices and N: An additional reason for using
2SLS is that the number of stations is likely to be measured with error because our data
for N correspond to stations operating during August 2007, while our price data were
collected in May 2006.
As explained in Section 4, free entry and a zero pro￿t condition predict a positive
relationship between the number of stations in the market and population size L, and a
negative relationship between N and entry costs: We do not have data on market-speci￿c
41We would also like to have a measure of the distance between stations in a municipality but unfor-
tunately we do not have these data.
27entry costs but we have data on the level of municipality taxes imposed on business real
estate and use these as a measure of E:42. First-stage regression results appear in Table 5.
In columns (1) we regress the number of stations (in logs) on population and the tax rate
(both in logs), while in column (2) we add 39 provincial dummies.43 Both instruments
have coe¢ cients with the predicted sign and are signi￿cantly correlated with ln(N):
As controls are added to the regression, in columns (3) and (4), the e⁄ect of taxes is
halved and loses it statistical signi￿cance. Nevertheless, in all regressions, the F-test for
joint signi￿cance of population and taxes is very high indicating that these are strong
instruments. Column (4) corresponds to the ￿rst-stage in the 2SLS procedure used in
Table 4.44 The overidenti￿cation tests in panel D in Table 4 do not reject the assumption
that the instruments are excluded from the price equations.45
Panel D in Table 4 reports the 2SLS estimates of ￿N using the same speci￿cation
as in panel C. The 2SLS results are in line with the previous estimates but they are larger
in absolute value than the OLS estimates in panel C; these di⁄erences are quantitatively
important. On the one hand, because unobserved determinants of prices are likely to be
positively correlated with the number of stations, using 2SLS should increase the absolute
value of the negative estimates of ￿ in the minimum and low percentiles￿regressions and
decrease the positive estimates of ￿ in the maximum and high percentiles￿regressions.
On the other hand, in the presence of measurement errors in N; OLS estimators are
biased towards zero in all the regressions. Since 2SLS also removes the correlation with
the measurement error, 2SLS estimates of the coe¢ cient in the lower price regressions
42Tax rates vary between 1.5 and 18 percent across municipalities with an average of 7.1 percent.
We also eperimented with multiplying the tax rate by the average value of land in the municipality to
generate another proxy for E; the ￿nal 2SLS estimates were almost identical to those obtained using
the tax rate only.
43Using the tax rate in levels instead of logs works equally well. We treat L and E symmetrically as
it would be suggested by a logarithmic approximation to the zero pro￿t condition (7).
44There are 424 municipalities with data on all covariates but one of them (Reiderland) does not have
residual price data. Thus, the total number of observations used in the price regressions in Table 4 is
423.
45Using lnL as the only instrument for lnN gives essentially the same estimates as in Table 4. But
using only the tax rate as the sole instrument gives much larger (in absolute value) 2SLS estimates of
￿N but also with much larger standard errors.
28should be, on both accounts, more negative than the OLS estimates. This is indeed what
we observe in panel D. For the higher price regressions, the biases in OLS due to omitted
variables and to measurement error work in opposite directions and it is therefore not
possible to predict in which direction the estimates should change with 2SLS.







These marginal e⁄ects are plotted in Figure 8 for N = 1;:::;20; along with a 2 standard
deviation band. We observe that for small values of N; the marginal e⁄ects are indeed
positive for the higher prices and negative for the smaller prices. These e⁄ects are also
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The logarithmic speci￿cation implies that marginal
e⁄ects converge to zero as N increases.
Using these estimates we ￿nd, for example, that adding 1 additional gas station to
a two-station market would lower the minimum price of a liter of Euro 95 by 0.24 cents
(￿0:58￿log1:5) and increase the maximum price by 0.81 cents. Recall that the standard
deviation in the residual price distribution is 1.05 cents and therefore these estimated
e⁄ects are quantitatively signi￿cant relative to the dispersion in prices.
If we were estimating the mean residual price, the e⁄ect of the market-level co-
variates would be identically zero because they are orthogonal to the residual price by
construction. However, because we are estimating quantiles of the residual price dis-
tribution these e⁄ects need not be zero. Nevertheless, the estimated coe¢ cients of the
control variables (not reported) are usually not signi￿cantly di⁄erent for zero, both in-
dividually and jointly. This is driven in part by the inclusion of regional dummies in
the regression which correlate with the municipality-level characteristics. Indeed, if the
provincial dummies are removed from the regressions in panel D, the controls are jointly
signi￿cant in four of the seven regressions (while the estimates of ￿N are virtually unaf-
fected). Moreover, as we will see later, when the actual instead of the residual prices are
used to compute the extreme prices and the quantiles, the controls are signi￿cant in all
regressions (see bottom panel in Table 7).
Finally, we also estimate ￿N at percentiles closer to the bounds of the price distri-
29bution, namely, the 1st to 5th and 95th to 99th percentiles. Table 6 presents these results.
The estimated e⁄ect of N on prices follows the same pattern as that in Table 4: negative
for the low prices and positive for the high prices.
In Tables 4 and 6 we also note that the estimated ￿N increase gradually in (ab-
solute) size as we move from the 25th(75th) percentile regression to the minimum (maxi-
mum) price regression, while they have about the same (absolute) size between the 25th
and 75th percentile regressions. Thus, increased competition is felt most strongly at the
extremes of the price distribution.
An alternative interpretation of these results is that the estimated e⁄ects re￿ ect our
inability to fully control for the e⁄ect of sample size on the extreme prices and quantiles.
Note, however, that our market sample sizes are quite large (50 percent of the markets
have values of K above 53 observations; the minimum value of K is 7 while the maximum
is 942) and therefore variations in Km across markets should have minimal e⁄ects, if at
all, on the estimated extreme prices and quantiles. Although estimates of the minimum
and of maximum prices, and of extreme quantiles as well, depend on the sample size,
these estimates will not change much if the sample size is already large. That is, K has
a diminishing marginal e⁄ect. We therefore do not expect that variations in extreme
prices and quantiles across markets re￿ ect variations in sample size. In any case, we do
control for sample size in the regressions but, as expected, the coe¢ cient of Km is never
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, and excluding the sample size from the regressions does
not a⁄ect any of the estimates of ￿N. Moreover, when we add a quadratic of sample
size (K2
m) to the regressions the estimates are not much a⁄ected and, if anything, they
become slightly stronger (results not reported). Thus, we do not believe that variation
in sample size across markets is driving our results.
To provide further support for this claim we estimated the speci￿cation in Panel
D of Table 4 on extreme percentiles and prices computed from a sample consisting of
randomly selected half the original number of observations in each market. If sample
sizes are important for the estimation of ￿N; then using half the sample should certainly
a⁄ect the estimated parameters. We repeated this estimation 1,000 times ￿each time
drawing 50 percent of the observations in each market ￿and averaged the 1,000 estimates
30of ￿N. For the minimum price regressions, this gives a mean estimate of ￿N equal to
￿0:55 with a standard deviation of 0.11. For the maximum price regressions, the mean
estimate of ￿N is 0:59 with a standard deviation of 0:08. The corresponding mean
estimates for the 10th and 90th percentiles are ￿0:06 (standard deviation 0:046) and 0:13
(standard deviation 0:062), respectively. Thus, the estimates of ￿N based on samples
half the sample size do not di⁄er substantially from the original estimates in panel D of
Table 4 supporting our conclusion that sample sizes in these data are large enough for
them not to matter.
In terms of the theoretical model presented in Sections 2 and 4 we observe that
Figure 6 (Example 2) predicts that the high percentiles of the price distribution increase
with N while the low percentiles decrease with N: This is what we found in the data.
Figure 6 also shows that the e⁄ect of N on the low percentiles increases as we move
towards the lower bound; this ￿second-order￿e⁄ect is also borne by the data. However,
the e⁄ect of N on the very high percentiles, although positive, decreases with N and
this is not what we see in the data. The reason for this di⁄erence in the theoretical
results is that the lower bound of the price distribution decreases with N while the
upper bound remains unchanged at v: Clearly, the model ought to be modi￿ed if we
want to accommodate this ￿second-order￿e⁄ect at the very high quantiles. It seems to
us that the model should allow for the upper bound of the price distribution to increase
with N; which could be obtained if consumers￿reservation value were made endogenous.
We believe, however, that for the purposes of organizing and interpreting the empirical
work the present modelling framework su¢ ces.
In sum, the empirical ￿ndings suggest that as the number of stations in the market
increases, the low prices tend to decrease while the high prices tend to increase. Although
we cannot check what happens to the mean residual price as N increases (but see next
Section for the e⁄ect of N on the mean raw price), we found that the median price is
lower in markets with more stations. This characterization of the e⁄ect of competition
on prices accords with models where some consumers have imperfect information about
prices and observe di⁄erent number of prices but is not consistent with the predictions
of standard oligopoly models. To the best of our knowledge, this asymmetric e⁄ect
31of a change in the number of ￿rms has not been analyzed empirically. The welfare
implications of such asymmetry will be studied in Section 8. We ￿rst perform a set of
robustness checks.
7.1 Robustness checks
We now examine some of the assumptions underlying our baseline speci￿cation in panel
D of Table 4 and verify the robustness of our conclusions to departures from these
assumptions.
We ￿rst address functional form issues. Although entering the number of stations
in logarithmic form is parsimonious as well as theoretically appealing ￿because N is likely
to have a smaller impact on ￿(N;x1) when N is large ￿it may be practically restrictive.
We therefore allowed the coe¢ cient of lnN to change for N ￿ N0; for various levels of N0
(N0 = 2;:::;17), but the interaction term was never large and usually not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero.46
We also added the square of ln(N) to the regression to allow for more ￿ exibility in
the marginal e⁄ect but this term was never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (its p-value
ranged between 0.34 and 0.99) except in the maximum price regression (p-value 0.06).47
Adding (ln(N))2 made the coe¢ cient of ln(N) also insigni￿cant. This is not surprising
because ln(N) and (ln(N))2 are highly correlated; their simple correlation coe¢ cient is
0.95. Although the individual parameters cannot be precisely estimated, the marginal
e⁄ects track very closely the marginal e⁄ects estimated from the regression in panel D
of Table 4 except, perhaps, for those of the 75th percentile price (see Figure 9).
We could avoid making strong functional form assumptions if we allow for the e⁄ect
of N to vary non-parametrically with N: This can be achieved by using dummy variables
for each value of N: The problem here is that N takes on 36 distinct values and the
corresponding dummies would still be endogenous. Even if we had the large number of
46The main exception was the interaction coe¢ cient in the median price regression which was signi￿-
cant in six out of the 16 cases. Interactions between the instruments (population and the tax rate) and
the threshold dummies where added to the list of instruments.
47We added the squares of log population and log tax to the list of instruments.
32instruments required (or use a control function approach), this approach is not practical
given our sample size. We therefore group the number of stations into 4 size groups and
add dummies corresponding to these groups. The four groups are de￿ned as markets
with 1 and 2 stations ￿the baseline group ￿ , markets with 3-6 stations, markets with 7-10
stations and markets with more that 11 stations. In order to address the endogeneity of
these group dummies we follow the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 623)
and ￿rst estimate a probit equation for the probability that the number of stations in
a market is in a given size group. We run a separate regression for each size group and
compute the predicted probability of belonging to a size group. In this regression we
include the same regressors as in the ￿rst stage of the 2SLS estimator in panel D of
Table 4. We then run the regressions as in panel D using the predicted probabilities as
instruments for the endogenous group dummies.48
Results of this two-stage 2SLS estimation are presented in the top panel of Table
7, where the coe¢ cients represent the change in price in a given group size relative to the
preceding group size. We see that markets with 3-6 stations have lower low prices but
higher high prices than markets with 1-2 stations. Markets with 7-10 stations exhibit
the same pattern, relative to markets with 3-6 stations, but the e⁄ects are of lower
magnitude and less signi￿cant. Finally, the estimates indicate that prices in markets
with 11 or more stations are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from prices in markets with 7-10
stations. These ￿ndings accord, at least in a qualitative sense, with the marginal e⁄ects
depicted in Figure 8. In sum, changing the simple functional form used in Table 4 would
not change our conclusions regarding the asymmetric e⁄ect of competition.
Recall that in (9) we made a separability assumption. We test for this assumption
as follows. We added the interaction between lnN and each of the controls (except
the provincial dummies) one at a time and estimated the model by 2SLS adding the
interaction between the control and lnL to the list of instruments. In no case were
the interaction terms signi￿cant. This test, albeit partial, suggests that the separability
48Wooldridge (2002, p. 623) shows that the ￿rst-stage probit regressions need not be correctly speci-
￿ed, and that inference based on the standard errors of the 2SLS procedure is correct even though the
instruments are generated in a previous step.
33assumption cannot be rejected in these data.
Next, we examine what happens to our estimates of ￿N when the dependent vari-
ables are based on the actual (raw) prices and not on the prices net of station and day
e⁄ects. We do not pool observations over time because the wholesale price may be chang-
ing over the sample period and therefore compute the percentiles and extremes of the
price distribution for each market and for each day. We can now also compute a mean
price for each market-day. But we cannot control for unobserved station-level e⁄ects be-
cause doing so wipes out all market-level regressors, including ln(N): We now have 7091
market-day observations. We estimate the same model as in panel D of Table 4.49 The
results using raw prices, which now include a regression for the mean price, are in the
bottom panel of Table 7. The mean and median price do not appear to be signi￿cantly
a⁄ected by the number of stations in the market but the low and high prices are. The
estimated parameters follow the same pattern as in Table 4 but are much stronger than
the estimates based on residual prices. This is to be expected simply because the distri-
bution of raw prices in a market is centered around higher prices and is more dispersed
than the distribution based on residual prices. Using raw prices in our analysis would
then pick up the impact of competition on the mean level of prices which, although of
interest and important for welfare, is not the main focus of this paper.
In contrast to the regressions in Table 4 where the dependent variables were based
on residual prices, the covariates are now jointly signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in all
regressions. Average household income and the share of cars registered to business always
have positive coe¢ cients but only the latter are signi￿cant. The geographic controls
are signi￿cant in four of the seven regressions. Interestingly, the sample size variable is
negative and signi￿cant in the minimum price and the 10thquantile regressions while it is
positive and signi￿cant in the 90th quantile and the maximum price regressions; it is not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the other regressions (results not reported). This is as
49The only di⁄erences with the speci￿cation in Table 4 are that the dependent variable and the sample
size regressor change over days, and that we added day dummies to control for the e⁄ect of the day in
the month. The other regressors are constant over time. Standard errors were clustered at the market
level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
34expected because now the sample size (Kmt) in these regressions is quite small ￿it varies
between 1 and 67 with a median of 3 stations (Kmt is now the number of stations in the
sample by market and day). Thus, it is not surprising that sample size is signi￿cant in
the regressions for the quantiles and extreme prices based on the raw price data. In fact,
this observation reinforces our previous observation that sample size is not important
when the sample size is large (as it is in Tables 4 and 6).
The number of stations in the market is de￿ned as the number of stations in the
municipality. It may well be that the ￿relevant￿ number of stations a⁄ecting prices
in a market includes the stations in neighboring municipalities. In order to examine
this possibility we computed, for each market m, the number of stations in all the
municipalities sharing a border with market m and added the logarithm of this variable to
the basic model. The results appear in the top panel of Table 8. We drop 3 municipalities
that are islands and therefore have no neighbors. Essentially, the number of gas stations
in neighboring markets has a much smaller e⁄ect on prices that the own number of
neighbors and, in all cases, this e⁄ect is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Importantly,
the estimated ￿N￿ s are almost una⁄ected by the inclusion of the number of neighboring
stations in the regression.50
We also re-run the regression excluding the four largest markets in the Netherlands
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, ￿ s-Gravenhage, and Utrecht). Since these cities represent only
4 observations we do not expect to obtain very di⁄erent results. And, indeed, the esti-
mated coe¢ cients based on restricted sample of smaller cities are very similar to those
in panel D of Table 4.51 In this vein, recall that the theoretical model presented in
Section 2 does not examine markets with a single station: There are 16 municipalities
where N = 1: We included these markets in the sample because it is quite likely that
consumers in these markets do in fact observe more than 1 price (i.e., they observe prices
in other municipalities as they travel to work). In any case, removing these observations
50Because provincial dummies pick up regional e⁄ects, we treat the number of neighboring stations
as exogenous in the price regressions. The overidenti￿cation tests support this assumption.
51These new estimates, in the order in which they appear in Table 4, are: -0.669 (0.231), -0.131
(0.0595), -0.0435 (0.0395), -0.0568 (0.0337), 0.0276 (0.0569), 0.105 (0.0721) 0.523 (0.145).
35from the regressions makes each of the estimated coe¢ cients even stronger.52
Finally, our ￿ndings are not restricted to a particular gas product (Euro 95). The
other popular product in gas stations is, of course, Diesel. The bottom panel in Table 8
replicates the regression in panel D of Table 4 for residual Diesel prices. The estimated
coe¢ cients are remarkably similar to those from the Euro 95 regressions.
8 Welfare implications
The evidence presented in Section 6 points to signi￿cant di⁄erences in the way increased
competition ￿ increased number of gas stations ￿ a⁄ects di⁄erent parts of the price
distribution. Whether consumers are successful in paying the lower prices depends on
their shopping behavior, i.e., on the number of prices they observe. Increased competition
is likely to favor more those consumers observing many prices because they are more likely
to observe one of the lower prices, while those observing only a few prices may not be that
lucky. Moreover, since the frequency of high prices may increase with the number of ￿rms
some consumers, at least theoretically, may end up paying higher prices. It is therefore
not obvious ￿in contrast to a full-information model ￿that all consumers bene￿t and,
when they do, whether they bene￿t in the same way from increased competition. In this
section we use the model presented in Section 2 to study and quantify the welfare gains
from increased competition for di⁄erent types of consumers.53
Denote the price paid by a consumer who observes s prices by ys = minfp1;p2;:::;psg
where p1;p2;:::;ps are i.i.d. random variables drawn from FN(p): For example, consumers
that observe only one price pay, on average, the mean price E[p]: The distribution of ys
is G(ys) = 1￿(1￿FN(ys))s: As in Section 4, we can derive the inverse of the distribution
of this statistic:
ys(￿(N);v;c) = c +
￿1(N)(v ￿ c)
PN




52The estimated coe¢ cients, in the order appearing in Table 4, are -0.712 (0.204), -0.099 (0.046),
-0.0766 (0.033), -0.0641(0.028), 0.0900 (0.041), 0.1472 (0.059), 0.5473 (0.117) and are slightly more
signi￿cant as those in panel D of Table 4.
53Note that we ignore non-price e⁄ects of competition such as better quality of service, shorter dis-
tances to gas stations, etc., so that ￿welfare e⁄ects￿refers only to price e⁄ects.
36where G takes values on [0;1]:
In this section, we analyze the e⁄ect of increased competition on the average price
paid by the consumer (the average transaction price). The expected price paid by a















As shown in Section 4, how E[ys(￿(N);v;c)] changes with N will depend on how
￿(N) changes into ￿(N + 1): We go back to our examples from Section 4.
Example 3 (continuation of Example 2). Recall that when N = 2 we assumed ￿(2) =
(0:5;0:5) and when N = 3 we had ￿(3) = (0:45;0:1;0:45): Let us suppose that N = 4; and
we have ￿(4) = (0:43;0:05;0:05;0:47): We numerically calculate the average price paid
E[ys(￿(N);v;c)] by the di⁄erent types of consumers s = 1;2;3;4 and for N = 2;3;4:
We obtain,
N=2 N=3 N=4
s=1 0.549 0.554 0.585
s=2 0.451 0.415 0.423
s=3 -- 0.353 0.343
s=4 -- -- 0.298
Expected price paid
Two main points deserve our attention. First, the price paid by some consumers
may increase, rather than decrease as N increases. This is the case for consumers who
are exposed to one price, as well as for consumers exposed to two prices when N increases
from 3 to 4: Second, the price paid by some consumers may be non-monotonic in N as in
the case of consumers who observe two prices. In this example these consumers bene￿t
when there is entry in a market with two ￿rms, but they pay a higher price when there
is entry in a market with three ￿rms.





for all ‘; FN dominates FN+1 in a ￿rst-order stochastic sense and, by implication, so
does GN over GN+1: As a result, the average price paid by all consumer types, E[ys]; will
decrease in N.
We estimate E[ys] for each market as follows. We draw s residual prices with re-
placement from the sample of Km residual prices observed in each municipality (pooled
over gas stations and days).54 We take the minimum of the s prices and store it. We
repeat this 10,000 times and compute the average of the 10,000 stored minimum prices.
This average is our estimate of E[ys] for each s = 1;2;:::;N in each market (character-
ized by a given N). That is, we obtain N estimates of E(ys) in each market corresponding
to the expected price paid by di⁄erent consumers observing, respectively, s = 1;:::;N
prices.
There are two dimensions of these estimates that are of interest. First, as consumers
observe more prices in a given market, the price they end up paying should be lower on
average. That is, broader price exposure should result in lower prices paid. We clearly
see this in Figure 10 where we plot the estimates of E[ys] in each market against s; as
well as the predicted value of a locally weighted regression of the estimate of E[ys] on
s: The gains from being better informed ￿the di⁄erence in expected price paid as s
increases by 1￿ are positive in 99.4 percent of the observations.
Although the path of expected prices paid in each market declines with s, Figure
10 points out that there is substantial heterogeneity in the price paid for given s across
markets. This heterogeneity is a re￿ ection of the di⁄erent price distributions across
markets having di⁄erent number of stations. This is precisely the other issue of interest
￿and the focus of this Section ￿ namely, the relationship between N and the price paid,
E[ys]; for given s:
To address this issue, we regress our estimate of E[ys] on ln(N) and on the other
controls used in the previous regressions. We run a separate 2SLS regression for various
54We report estimates based on prices drawn with replacement. Since, in reality, consumers do not
sample with replacement we also replicated our calculations when prices are drawn without replacement;
the results are practically identical.
38values of s: Note that when s = 1 the estimate of E[y1] = E[p] is the mean price in the
market which is zero by construction. We therefore present, in Table 9, the estimated
e⁄ect of ln(N) on E[ys] for s = 2;:::;7; i.e., for consumers that observe up to 7 prices.
Note also that as s increases, the number of observations declines because there are
fewer municipalities with N above s (see Table 2) and the parameters are not precisely
estimated for s ￿ 5.
Two results in Table 9 are noteworthy. First, the estimates are all negative. A
negative coe¢ cient means that the prices paid by consumers decrease as the number
of competitors increases. All types of consumers bene￿t from increasing the number
of gas stations. Second, the negative e⁄ect of N increases with the number of price
observations (s) up to, and including, s = 4 but stabilizes thereafter. This means that
the gains from increased competition ￿in terms of price reduction ￿are maximal for
consumers observing 4 prices. Entry of additional stations does not result in additional
gains for consumers who observe 5 or more prices. In sum, the magnitude of the welfare
improvement depends on shopping behavior: it is about twice as large for consumers
that observe 4-5 prices than for consumers that observe only 2 prices.
Finally, we note that the welfare analysis was based on residual prices. It is con-
ceivable that the stations￿characteristics and/or their productivity also respond to com-
petition and that this response is re￿ ected in the stations￿mean prices. By focusing on
the residual prices we may be missing these kind of e⁄ects. In our data, however, we
may not be missing much because we did not ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of the number of
stations on the mean price of gasoline (bottom panel in Table 7).
9 Conclusions
In markets where the amount of price information varies across consumers, prices are
typically dispersed in equilibrium. An increase in the number of ￿rms usually a⁄ects each
seller￿ s pricing strategy and this in turn alters the entire distribution of equilibrium prices.
Traditionally, empirical research has focused on estimating the impact of competition on
39the mean and variance of prices.55 Although this is certainly useful, these statistics
are not su¢ cient to perform a detailed welfare analysis because competition can a⁄ect
di⁄erent parts of the price distribution in opposite directions.
This paper has tried to ￿ll this gap. We examined how the distribution of gasoline
prices in the Netherlands changes with the number of competitors in the market. We used
population size and local taxes as instruments for the number of gas stations. We found
that as competition ￿the number of gas stations ￿increases the distribution of prices
spreads out, with the low prices going down and the high prices going up. Consequently,
competition has an asymmetric e⁄ect on prices.
This result has important welfare implications because when some prices increase
and others decline, the price actually paid by consumers will depend on their shopping
behavior. All (hypothetical) consumers in our data, irrespective of whether they are
informed about one or more prices, bene￿t from an increase in the number of stations.
The magnitude of the welfare gain, however, is greater for those consumers that observe
more prices. As a result, an increase in competition has a positive but unequal e⁄ect on
the welfare of consumers.
Our empirical strategy and interpretation of the results are closely linked to the
theoretical model presented in Section 2 which we believe to be appropriate to the re-
tail gasoline market. The model makes clear that increased competition has an e⁄ect
on prices only when it increases the amount of price information consumers have. The
paper can therefore be also interpreted as examining the e⁄ect of changes in consumers￿
information on the distribution of prices. Thus, policies aimed at increasing the amount
of price information (e.g., through mandatory price labels) or at lowering the costs of
disseminating and gathering information (e.g., through the Internet) can a⁄ect the dis-
tribution of prices and welfare.
Since price dispersion is prevalent in many markets, we believe the paper has a
general message that goes beyond the present application to the gasoline market in the
55In our data, the standard deviation of residual prices increases with the number of stores. The
2SLS coe¢ cient of ln(N) in a regression speci￿cation similar to those in panel D of Table 4 is 0.086 (s.e.
0.033).
40Netherlands. The price e⁄ects of competition-enhancing policies (e.g., industry deregu-
lation, trade liberalization, etc.) are not as straightforward as one may be led to believe
based on standard oligopoly theory. As a result, welfare implications are not obvious
either. In fact, we have shown, theoretically and empirically, that increased competi-
tion can have unequal e⁄ects among consumers; some consumers may even experience
declines in their welfare as a result of higher prices.
In order to identify which consumers bene￿t more and which bene￿t less from
increased competition in gasoline prices we would require a mapping between shopping
behavior and socio-economic characteristics of interest. If such data were available we
would be able to say something about how the distribution of the bene￿ts from increased
competition varies with income. For example, consumers that observe only a few prices
may be high-income consumers (whose value of time is higher) and these consumers may
bene￿t less from competition than low-income consumers. This, however, is beyond the
scope of this paper and is left for future research. Moreover, a complete welfare analysis,
should recognize the e⁄ect of increased competition on other dimensions of consumer
welfare such as increased variety, quality and accessibility.
Lastly, although our empirical work is motivated by a particular theoretical frame-
work, we think the empirical ￿ndings reported in the paper are of interest on their
own right and, if veri￿ed in other data sets, they should be taken into account when
formulating theoretical models of pricing in oligopolistic markets.
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48Figure 5: FN(p) for N = 2 and 3; ￿(2) = (0:5;0:5); ￿(3) = (0:45;0:52;0:03)
49Figure 6: FN(p) for N = 2 and 3; ￿(2) = (0:5;0:5); ￿(3) = (0:45;0:1;0:45)
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Figure 10: Expected price paid and number of price obsrevations
54Table 1. One-week transtition matrix (percentages)
q1 q2 q3 q4
q1 33 22 22 22
t q2 27 27 27 18
q3 32 23 28 17
q4 27 22 31 20
A station enters the calulations only when it has data at t and at t+7. Entries in each are weighted averages of the week-specific transtition 
probabilities for each day t with weights equal to the share of observations in day t in the originating quartile out of the total number 
of observations for all days. Entries may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
t+7Table 2. Distribution of number of gas stations across markets
Number of
stores Frequency Percent Cumulative
1 16 3.6 3.6
2 35 8.0 11.6
3 45 10.2 21.8
4 48 10.9 32.7
5 56 12.7 45.5
6 36 8.2 53.6
7 26 5.9 59.6
8 30 6.8 66.4
9 24 5.5 71.8
10 21 4.8 76.6
11 19 4.3 80.9
12 17 3.9 84.8
13 8 1.8 86.6
14 10 2.3 88.9
15 8 1.8 90.7
16 6 1.4 92.1
17 2 0.5 92.5
18 7 1.6 94.1
19 3 0.7 94.8
21 1 0.2 95.0
22 2 0.5 95.5
23 2 0.5 95.9
24 1 0.2 96.1
25 2 0.5 96.6
26 1 0.2 96.8
27 3 0.7 97.5
29 1 0.2 97.7
30 1 0.2 98.0
31 1 0.2 98.2
32 1 0.2 98.4
33 1 0.2 98.6
37 2 0.5 99.1
39 1 0.2 99.3
47 1 0.2 99.6
59 1 0.2 99.8
80 1 0.2 100.0
Total 440 100Table 3. Residual price distribution by number of gas stations
Number of Minimum 10
th  25
th  Median 75
th  90
th  Maximum
stores price percentile percentile price percentile percentile price
1 -1.54 -1.23 -0.74 -0.13 0.81 1.4 1.88
2 -1.45 -1.12 -0.72 -0.17 0.64 1.39 1.92
3 -1.9 -1.22 -0.76 -0.16 0.8 1.48 2.25
4 -1.73 -1.18 -0.75 -0.17 0.75 1.47 2.38
5 -2.02 -1.21 -0.76 -0.16 0.7 1.49 2.44
6 -1.85 -1.19 -0.76 -0.19 0.72 1.53 2.38
7 -1.94 -1.23 -0.76 -0.19 0.74 1.54 2.51
8 -2.83 -1.26 -0.79 -0.18 0.79 1.54 2.77
9 -2.27 -1.23 -0.74 -0.22 0.74 1.52 2.8
10 -2.27 -1.23 -0.79 -0.19 0.74 1.52 2.65
11 -2.27 -1.22 -0.79 -0.18 0.81 1.51 2.59
12 -2.37 -1.23 -0.78 -0.18 0.75 1.53 2.75
13 -2.12 -1.15 -0.72 -0.16 0.68 1.44 2.29
14 -2.57 -1.24 -0.76 -0.16 0.72 1.59 2.65
15 -2.68 -1.24 -0.75 -0.15 0.73 1.44 2.83
16 -2.99 -1.16 -0.7 -0.15 0.71 1.41 2.59
17 -2.18 -1.32 -0.87 -0.2 0.9 1.58 2.67
18 -2.68 -1.24 -0.76 -0.18 0.74 1.54 3.11
19 -2.89 -1.25 -0.75 -0.21 0.81 1.49 2.64
21 -2.06 -1.2 -0.74 -0.27 0.74 1.49 2.41
22 -3.02 -1.36 -0.78 -0.1 0.88 1.47 2.73
23 -2.88 -1.16 -0.73 -0.14 0.67 1.43 2.76
24 -1.95 -1.31 -0.93 -0.18 0.86 1.79 2.61
25 -2.43 -1.19 -0.71 -0.2 0.68 1.45 2.64
26 -3.37 -1.32 -0.82 -0.19 0.8 1.54 2.72
27 -2.94 -1.25 -0.83 -0.21 0.75 1.53 2.88
29 -2.05 -1.34 -0.84 -0.14 0.71 1.4 2.47
30 -4.04 -1.24 -0.81 -0.19 0.85 1.58 4.16
31 -2.64 -1.24 -0.77 -0.18 0.72 1.46 2.53
32 -3.34 -1.18 -0.74 -0.19 0.8 1.37 2.89
33 -3.7 -1.17 -0.8 -0.17 0.52 1.45 3.14
37 -2.31 -1.22 -0.76 -0.26 0.75 1.55 3.4
39 -4.07 -1.28 -0.76 -0.09 0.76 1.64 3.43
47 -4.66 -1.26 -0.76 -0.23 0.73 1.61 3.23
59 -2.5 -1.25 -0.79 -0.18 0.78 1.45 2.8
80 -5.52 -1.28 -0.74 -0.25 0.75 1.54 3.32
Entries are weighted averages of each residual price statistic over all markets (municipalities)
where the weights are the municipality's share of observations. Unweighted results are very similar. Table 4. Effect of number of gas stations on the price distribution
minimum 10th 25th median 75th 90th  maximum
price percentile percentile price  percentile percentile price
Log (number of stations) -0.508*** -0.0266 -0.0163* -0.0161* 0.00715 0.0438** 0.368***
(0.0523) (0.0175) (0.00958) (0.00897) (0.0138) (0.0173) (0.0341)
R-squared 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.16
Log (number of stations) -0.549*** -0.0285 -0.0209** -0.0239** 0.0165 0.0513*** 0.356***
(0.0606) (0.0194) (0.0106) (0.00960) (0.0164) (0.0196) (0.0408)
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.25
Log (number of stations) -0.305*** -0.0168 -0.0248 -0.0227 -0.000228 0.0428 0.320***
(0.0886) (0.0337) (0.0196) (0.0189) (0.0312) (0.0373) (0.0640)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.00 0.98 0.65 0.33 0.95 0.14 0.64
R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.27
Log (number of stations) -0.580*** -0.101** -0.0487* -0.0507** 0.0403 0.102** 0.518***
(0.171) (0.0423) (0.0280) (0.0241) (0.0406) (0.0510) (0.0970)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.37 0.77 0.44 0.13 0.95 0.04 0.46
J-test (p-value) 0.99 0.90 0.70 0.40 0.60 0.29 0.59
R-squared 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.26
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area  (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of  sampled observations by market.
The top two panels are based on 439 observations. The bottom two panels are based on 423 observations; we loose 16 observations because 
of missing municipality-level data on the other controls. The instruments in the 2SLS panel are population size and local tax rates, both in logs.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel D: 2SLS with 39 provincial dummies and other controls
Panel A: OLS without controls 
Panel B: OLS with 39 provincial dummies
Panel C: OLS with 39 provincial dummies and other controls(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(population) 0.821*** 0.805*** 0.760*** 0.758***
(0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0633) (0.0637)
Log(municipal tax) -0.189*** -0.176*** -0.0850 -0.0811
(0.0663) (0.0668) (0.0659) (0.0666)
Average income per hh -- -- 0.00162 0.00121
(0.0112) (0.0112)
Share of business cars -- -- 1.515*** 1.514***
(0.543) (0.543)
Area -- -- 0.0000664 0.0000700
(0.000384) (0.000386)
Land area -- -- 0.00365*** 0.00366***
(0.000710) (0.000711)
Urbanized land share  -- -- -0.00284 -0.00286
(0.00292) (0.00292)
Agragrian land share  -- -- -0.00201 -0.00203
(0.00165) (0.00165)
Road length (km) -- -- -0.00128*** -0.00128***
(0.000265) (0.000265)
Sample size -- -- 0.00300*** 0.00301***
(0.000695) (0.000696)
F-test for significance of IV's  580.1 602.9 72.2 72.2
Provincial Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 424 423
R-squared 0.72 0.81 0.84 0.84
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Determinants of the number of gas stations
Dep. var.: log(number of stations)Table 6. Effect of number of gas stations on the price distribution -- additional quantiles (2SLS)
minimum 1th % 2nd % 3rd % 4th % 5th % 10th % 25th %
price
lnst -0.580*** -0.5873*** -0.3237*** -0.1871** -0.1513* -0.0794 -0.101** -0.0487*
(0.171) (.1559) (.108) (.0894) (.0852) (.0701) (0.0423) (0.0280)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.37 0.04 0.13 0.38 0.45 0.54 0.77 0.44
J-test (p-value) 0.99 0.36 0.31 0.81 0.74 0.6 0.9 0.7
R-squared 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12
50th % 75th % 90th % 95th % 96th % 97th % 98th % 99th % maximum
price
lnst -0.0507** 0.0403 0.102** 0.1727*** 0.1865*** 0.2493*** 0.31737*** 0.4464*** 0.518***
(0.0241) (0.0406) (0.0510) (.0635) (.0682) (.0736) (.0803) (.0877) (0.0970)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.13 0.95 0.04 0.68 0.48 0.51 0.18 0.01 0.46
J-test (p-value) 0.4 0.6 0.29 0.52 0.1 0.09 0.46 0.7 0.59
R-squared 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.26
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area  (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of  sampled observations by market.
Based on 423 observations. The instruments are population size and local tax rates, both in logs.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 7. Robustness checks I
minimum 10th 25th median 75th 90th  maximum
price percentile percentile price  percentile percentile price
3 - 6 Stations -0.4246*** -0.1440** -0.0939** -0.0629* 0.0801 0.2209*** 0.6927***
(.1649) (.0671) (.0435) (.0366) (.0619) (.0792) (.1223)
7 - 10 Stations -0.4154 -0.0370 -0.0098 -0.0501** 0.0106 0.0179 0.2410**
(.3464) (.0378) (.0265) (.0234) (.0388) (.0519) (.1146)
11+ Stations -0.3321 -0.0036 -0.0296 0.0193 0.0617 0.0779 0.0355
(.3229) (.0404) (.0279) (.0233) (.0396) (.0569) (.1584)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.03 0.99 0.49 0.32 0.88 0.08 0.50
R-squared 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.25
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of  sampled observations by market.
The instruments in the 2SLS regression are the predicted probabilities of belonging to a group size. The equation is just idenitifed. These predictions were obtained from a first-stage probit 
regression of  each size dummy on population size and local tax rates (both in logs) as well as on the other controls and provincial dummies. 
The number of observations in each regression is 423 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
minimum 10th 25th mean median 75th  90th  maximum
price percentile percentile price price percentile percentile price
Log (number of stations) -1.423*** -1.434*** -0.818** -0.184 -0.251 0.402 1.336*** 1.354***
(.376) (.373) (.387) (.384) (.421) (.432) (.415) (.414)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00
J-test (p-value) 0.28 0.47 0.52 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.06 0.18
R-squared 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.38 0.41
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of sampled stations in each market-day. The instruments are population size and local tax rates, both in logs.
The number of market-day observations in each regression is 7091. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4 Size Groups: Two-stage 2SLS with 39 provincial dummies and other controls
Raw prices:  2SLS with 39 provincial dummies and other controlsTable 8. Robustness checks II
minimum 10th 25th median 75th 90th  maximum
price percentile percentile price percentile percentile price
Log (number of stations) -0.567*** -0.0950** -0.0422 -0.0493** 0.0272 0.0886* 0.502***
(0.176) (0.0430) (0.0292) (0.0235) (0.0414) (0.0520) (0.101)
Log (number of neighbouring stations) 0.0188 -0.00210 -0.00829 0.00587 0.0214 0.00466 0.00684
(0.0773) (0.0221) (0.0158) (0.0134) (0.0223) (0.0293) (0.0493)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.42 0.45 0.55 0.44 0.81 0.12 0.48
J-test (p-value) 0.99 0.90 0.70 0.40 0.60 0.29 0.59
R-squared 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.25
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of  sampled observations by market. The instruments are population size and local tax rates, both in logs.
Based on 420 observations corresponding to municipalities with non-zero number of neighbours. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
minimum 10th 25th median 75th 90th  maximum
price percentile percentile price percentile percentile price
Log (number of stations) -0.474** -0.0791 -0.0736*** -0.0146 0.0738** 0.0910** 0.502***
(0.214) (0.0553) (0.0274) (0.0202) (0.0317) (0.0462) (0.101)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.41 0.44 0.21
J-test (p-value) 0.81 0.15 0.45 0.06 0.13 0.41 0.17
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.29
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of  sampled observations by market. The instruments are population size and local tax rates, both in logs.
Based on 424 observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Adding Neighbours : 2SLS with 39 provincial dummies and other controls
Diesel: 2SLS with 39 provincial dummies and other controlsTable 9. Expected price paid and the number of gas stations
Dep. Var: Expected price paid when observing s prices,  E[Min{p1,p2,...,ps}]
Number of observations (s) s = 2 s = 3 s = 4 s = 5 s = 6 s = 7
Log (number of stations) -0.0689*** -0.0924** -0.163*** -0.133* -0.136 -0.115
(0.0182) (0.0375) (0.0564) (0.0760) (0.0975) (0.127)
Tests:
Other controls zero (p-value) 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.15
J-test (p-value) 0.93 0.62 0.59 0.78 0.27 0.26
Number of observations 407 373 329 282 227 192
R-squared 0.041 0.012 0.007 0.021 0.058 0.068
Other controls include: average income per household, share of business cars, area (km
2), land area, urbanized and agrarian land shares, road length (km)
and the number of  sampled observations by market.
The instruments are population size and local tax rates, both in logs.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1